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Abstract – The enormous discrepancy between risk perception and the risk associated with nuclear power utilization will further 
perpetuate after the recent accident in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in Japan. Complete and transparent risk 
assessment is an assumption for an improvement in risk understanding. This paper contains an overview of approaches and the 
results of risk assessment of nuclear power in the context of energy utilization. It is possible to improve understanding of the risk 
based on numerous risk assessments carried out for NPPs worldwide, our own experience, and assessments based on cumulative 
operating experience. The paper presents an updated risk assessment from nuclear power in the light of a recent accident in Japan 
and it also implies possible causes that led to overlook a concrete hazard from tsunami in the original risk assessment. Assessment of 
relevance of the Fukushima event on reliability of risk assessment from nuclear power in the world is of huge importance for further 
deliberation on utilization of nuclear power. It is undisputable that these activities will demonstrate, and at some locations improve, 
NPP’s high safety level. Still, perception in general public remains one of the most relevant challenges for optimal planning of the 
future of the energy sector.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Risk is generally defined as a potential exposure to 
loss created by a hazard. A hazard is a situation (physi-
cal or societal) that, if encountered, could initiate a 
range of undesirable consequences. Risk assessment 
is the process of obtaining a quantitative estimate of a 
risk (probability and consequences), [1].
There are several questions one might raise when 
considering risks. Excluding the questions related to 
risk assessment, it seems very important to realize that 
risk management is not possible without answers to 
some additional questions. Here we raise two espe-
cially important ones. How do we decide if a certain 
risk is acceptable or not? Having a risk in mind, what 
about the benefits of technology utilization? Without 
having the complete picture of the risk we are facing 
and answers to at least these two additional questions, 
it seems impossible to rationally decide on an optimal 
solution with the least risk. We then behave with dan-
ger that unnecessary fear is a bigger risk than what we 
are afraid of in the first place. 
This paper presents results of risk assessment from 
nuclear energy in comparison with other energy sourc-
es, and regular risks we face in everyday life. This is done 
by the idea to point out that there is a greater need to 
focus our risk reduction strategies better, and perhaps 
to reduce our total risk from energy use with wasting 
fewer resources. This approach is applicable in other 
areas of life but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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2. RISK FROM NUCLEAR POWER
Nuclear power plants are technical facilities for elec-
tricity generation in large amounts from nuclear fuel, 
characterized by high capacity and availability factor. 
Like any advanced technology, there exists a relatively 
small risk related to the operation of nuclear power 
plants and it is realized with three major accidents.
In general, we approach risk assessment depending 
on the existing evidence and experience. New risks 
from unknown technology and small risks from very re-
liable technology are estimated by means of risk mod-
eling. This is an approach where expert analysts devel-
op a mathematical representation of a physical facility 
and a risk imposed to the environment and human 
health. With big risks, a situation is simpler because it 
can be assessed statistically. The risk of utilization of 
nuclear energy in nuclear power plants is an example 
of a small risk with few accidents where only limited 
consequences have occurred, and certain crucial char-
acteristics are very unique.  
The risk can affect people, materials and the envi-
ronment. In terms of the time of realization, the risk is 
usually divided into two categories: short-term (imme-
diate, acute) and delayed (subchronical and chronical). 
The uncertainty of assessed risks grows with time, and 
this presents a significant problem with certainty of 
particular predictions.
2.1. RISK ASSESSMENT
There are numerous methods developed and used 
for risk assessment, and some of the well known are 
e.g. What-if, HAZOP, Fault Tree, and Event Tree analysis. 
Most comprehensive risk assessment is usually known 
as probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), where usually 
a combination of fault and event tree methods is used 
with full coverage of special type of events and fail-
ures (i.e., external events, human errors, and common 
cause failures). Figure 1 presents a schematic of general 
framework used in all risk assessment methods.
Fig. 1. General framework used in all risk 
assessment methods, [14]
The risk of utilization of nuclear energy in nuclear 
power plants is typically assessed based on a math-
ematical and logical model of the plant. This is often 
referred to as probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). PSA is 
the most comprehensive approach to quantification of 
risk and safety where risk is a combination of probabil-
ity and severity of that harm, while safety is freedom 
from unacceptable risk.
According to Hirschberg et al. [2], the use of a plant-
specific PSA is the most rationale basis for the estimate 
of hypothetical consequences of severe accidents and 
the associated monetized damages. The results ob-
tained from such an approach are by definition repre-
sentative of the case being studied. In addition, it en-
ables treatment of uncertainties in a transparent and 
disciplined way. In the case where this approach is not 
feasible, any extrapolation of results obtained for a spe-
cific plant in a specific environment must be done with 
great care and the reference case should be carefully 
selected with a view to similarities in the design phi-
losophy and the operating environment. Some assess-
ments published earlier do not exhibit such necessary 
care.
One of the results for NPP’s PSA is an estimate of the 
so-called core damage frequency (CDF). The nuclear 
reactor core is melt to some extent (partially or com-
pletely) in case when generated heat is not sufficiently 
removed during operation or shutdown mode. This fre-
quency is within the range of 10-6 to 10-3 per year for the 
fleet of reactors in operation. These results are proven 
by numerous specific PSA studies
For new reactors to come into operation the CDF is 
estimated to be within the range between 10-8 and 10-6 
per year, and this represents a significant improvement 
in plant design.  Such high improvement from already 
safe designs is realized with additional safety systems 
redundancy or, what is much better, with so-called pas-
sive or inherent safety where a safe state is achievable 
without an immediate need for power supply or hu-
man actions. A PSA must be done separately for each 
power plant but here are some typical results: a fuel 
meltdown might be expected once in 20,000 years of 
reactor operation. In 2 out of 3 meltdowns, there would 
be no deaths, in 1 out of 5 there would be over 1,000 
deaths, and in 1 out of 100,000 there would be 50,000 
deaths. The average for all meltdowns would be 400 
deaths. Very high radiation doses can destroy body 
functions and lead to death within 60 days, but such 
“noticeable” deaths would be expected in only 2% of 
reactor meltdown accidents; there would be over 100 
in 0.2% of meltdowns, and 3,500 in 1 out of 100,000 
meltdowns, [6].
Radiation causes ionizations in the molecules of 
living cells. These ionizations result in the removal of 
electrons from atoms, forming ions or charged atoms. 
The ions then can go on to react with other atoms in 
the cell, causing damage. The principal risks associ-
ated with nuclear power arise from health effects of 
potential radiation. It is difficult to estimate risks from 
radiation, for most of the radiation exposures humans 
receive are very close to background levels.
The use of radiation and nuclear techniques in medi-
cine, industry, agriculture, energy and other scientific 
and technological fields has brought large benefits 
to society. The benefits in medicine for diagnosis and 
treatment in terms of human lives saved are enormous. 
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Radiation is a key tool in the treatment of certain kinds 
of cancer. Three out of every four patients hospitalized 
in the industrial countries benefit from some form of 
nuclear medicine. The beneficial impacts in other fields 
are similar. No human activity or practice is totally de-
void of associated risks. Radiation should be viewed 
from the perspective that the benefit from it to man-
kind is far less harmful than from many most common 
agents.
According to the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radia-
tion Committee V (BEIR V) [3], the risk of cancer death 
is 0.08% per rem for doses received rapidly (acute) and 
might be 2-4 times (0.04% per rem) less than that for 
doses received over a long period of time (chronic). 
These risk estimates are an average for all ages, males 
and females, and all forms of cancer. There is a great 
deal of uncertainty associated with the estimate. Later 
report BEIR VII [4] risk estimates for fatal cancer are simi-
lar to the values from BEIR V, but they also estimated in-
cidence rates, which were about 50% of the fatal cancer 
rate. Other scientific groups have estimated risk from 
radiation exposure. The other estimates are not the ex-
act same as the BEIR V estimates, due to differing meth-
ods of risk and assumptions used in the calculations, 
but all are close.
Based on the PSA performed for NPPs, a short term 
radiation risk is about 10-6 per man-year, and smaller 
for delayed effects. Uncertainty about prediction for 
delayed risk is extremely uncertain and because of this 
surrounded by many controversies. The act that risk 
from nuclear power plant operation is one of the most 
explored and analyzed is not sufficient to reduce its 
controversy.
2.2. RISK FROM NUCLEAR POWER BASED ON 
 OPERATING EXPERIENCE
In more than fifty years of nuclear power usage three 
major accidents have occurred in NPPs. This happened 
because of breach in so-called defense in depth safety 
approach for preventing and mitigating accidents. This 
means redundancy, diversity and independence for 
safety features. This approach guarantees a very high 
level of safety if implemented with careful investigation 
of all internal, and especially external threats (so-called 
initiating events). This technical reality means little with 
biased and incomplete media coverage of everything 
what happens regularly in some NPP, [6].
Practical experience from NPP operation is most im-
portant after safe design. Incident reporting has be-
come an increasingly important aspect of the opera-
tion and regulation of all public health and safety-re-
lated industries. Diverse industries such as aeronautics, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals and explosives all depend 
on operating experience feedback to provide lessons 
learned about safety. The structured reporting system 
is an essential element of the international operating 
experience feedback system for nuclear power plants. 
These reports contain information on events of safety 
significance with important lessons learned. These ex-
periences assist in reducing or eliminating recurrence 
of events at other plants. For nuclear energy current cu-
mulative operating experience of commercial nuclear 
power plants worldwide is about 15,000 reactor-years.
Three major accidents have happened during this 
period: Three Mile Island partial core meltdown in 1979 
in Pennsylvania; Chernobyl complete core meltdown 
and disintegration in 1986 in Ukraine; and Fukushima 
Daiichi major core meltdowns in three reactors in 2011 
in Japan.
It is demonstrated in different ways in all these ac-
cidents that defense in depth could be compromised 
if there is a neglected possibility that a particular con-
dition (disaster) might knock out all backup systems. 
Even the reactor can have many layers of reserve de-
fense, if they can all be disabled by a same cause (e.g. 
tsunami beyond design basis in case of Fukushima), 
then redundancy does not mean any additional pro-
tection as it was planned.
In the Three Mile Island accident where at least 
two equipment failures were severely compounded 
by human errors, two lines of defense were still not 
breached. Essentially the radioactivity remained sealed 
in the steel reactor vessel, and that vessel was sealed 
inside the heavily reinforced concrete and steel lined 
containment which was never even challenged. It was 
clearly not a close call on disaster to the surrounding 
population. This accident did not have any short-term, 
or delayed casualties.
The Soviet reactor in Chernobyl, built on a much less 
safe design concept did not have a protective contain-
ment structure; if it had, that disaster would have been 
contained without radioactive contamination. This ac-
cident has caused hundreds of short-term deaths, and 
thousand long-term deaths (numbers are equally con-
troversial and impossible to check).
The earthquake that hit Japan was several times 
more powerful than the worst earthquake the NPP was 
built for. When the earthquake hit, all nuclear reactors 
successfully went to shutdown. At this point, the cool-
ing system has to carry away the residual heat, about 
7% of the full power heat load under normal operat-
ing conditions. The earthquake destroyed the exter-
nal power supply of the nuclear reactor. This is a very 
challenging accident for a nuclear power plant, and is 
referred to as a “loss of offsite power.” The reactor and 
its backup systems are designed to handle this type 
of accident by using backup power systems to keep 
the coolant pumps and instrumentation and control 
working. Furthermore, since the power plant was shut 
down, it could not produce any electricity by itself. For 
the first hour, the first set of multiple emergency diesel 
power generators started and provided the electricity 
that was needed. However, when the tsunami arrived, 
it flooded diesel generators, causing them to fail, and 
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made lots of damage to the site which prevented a 
number of safety functions and activities for their re-
covery. 
The first explosion at the reactor caused a dozen in-
juries, and the subsequent mass evacuation of more 
than 100,000 people brought with it risks and social 
impacts. Some sickness and injury occurred among the 
workers trying to stabilize the plant, although expo-
sure was managed within accepted emergency rates. 
Despite this, in an earthquake catastrophe that claimed 
some 27,000 lives, the nuclear accident has not caused 
any fatalities. Radiation effects from beyond the plant 
and its nearby surroundings have been short-lived.
Such major underestimation of tsunami is evidently 
a mistake. It is easier to understand that mistake when 
it is known that tsunami does not happen with every 
(ocean) earthquake, and this one in Japan has had an 
amplification effect from three sources of water mass 
movements (see Figure 2).
Fig. 2. Model for explanation of tsunami height in Fukushima 1 accident, [5]
The concept of defense in depth guides engineers to 
design a plant that can withstand severe catastrophes, 
even when several systems fail. In Fukushima 1, imple-
mented protection was insufficient in a number of ways. 
Firstly, physical protection from tsunami was far too inad-
equate. Then, the redundant on-site power supply was 
unnecessarily placed on the lower levels, and left without 
waterproof protection. When the diesel generators failed 
after the tsunami, the reactor operators switched to emer-
gency battery power. The batteries were designed as one 
of the backup systems to provide power for cooling the 
core for 8 hours. Flooding resulted in an electrical system 
failure even before these 8 hours expired. The available 
analysis shows that the total radiological contamination 
in Fukushima could have been significantly reduced if 
only reactor relief had been initiated sooner after station 
blackout condition had occurred. The irony is that relief 
was halted for hours in order to leave time for evacuation, 
but that caused a too high temperature in the reactors, re-
lease of hydrogen and consequently further destruction 
and much higher total radiological release.
In essence, it is evident that even with the worst pos-
sible scenario in Fukushima 1 there was no short-term 
casualty, and the delayed casualties were so far limited 
to only few extra exposed workers at the site during 
emergency in the beginning.
These three accidents in 15,000 reactor years of expe-
rience provide the basis for the statistical risk estimate. 
Results derived from PSA models are comparable to 
simple calculation with cumulated nuclear energy ex-
perience. A number of realized accidents over cumula-
tive experience provides that practically proven CDF is 
about 10-4 per reactor year.
From all NPP accidents, it is obvious that short-term 
casualties are possible only with a highly unsafe ap-
proach and lack of standard containment protection 
like in Chernobyl. The only risk that remains in the case 
29
of significant radiological contamination is the one 
related to the delayed consequences. This is the case 
with Chernobyl and it will be the case with Fukushima 
1. It seems that the problem of estimating the number 
of delayed casualties is highly neglected and usual ap-
proaches are not properly suited for the problem. One 
context is defining the regulation limits with conser-
vatism and technology capabilities in mind, and very 
different when real life consequences for certain expo-
sure to small levels of agents occur. An inflated number 
of delayed casualties from Chernobyl and Fukushima 
accidents is based on the so-called linear no threshold 
hypothesis (LNT). This is based only on the extrapolat-
ing low-dose consequences from the known and dem-
onstrated relations. The fact that LNT was never proven 
and that in fact numerous studies have proven quite 
the opposite is simply ignored because of the main 
purpose of LNT: a simple and conservative regulation. 
Effects measured for small doses prove that at the low-
dose level there is not just a smaller consequence, but 
LNT also predicts positive effects. This is a known and 
researched phenomenon with other agents (i.e., chem-
icals) and it is called hormesis. Figure 3 illustrates the 
main differences between LNT and hormesis models. 
Consequences are measurable and verifiable with 
doses around 200 mSv (for some, this threshold is 100 
mSv); all exposures below this are possible to estimate 
with prediction. The LNT model simply draws the line 
to zero consequences when the dose is zero. Obviously, 
this simplification has as a result that our surrounding 
naturally occurring radiation has a certain risk for us. 
The problem is that millions of people are exposed to 
a variation of several times the difference of this radia-
tion with extremes of 50 times higher doses without 
any noticeable effects and without any proof that LNT 
is correct. In fact, hormesis is proven by a number of 
studies made on patients and special occupation expo-
sures to low levels of radiation doses [7]. Therefore, the 
hormesis model is proposed in order to estimate more 
accurately consequences from small doses. With this 
model, effects are much smaller from small doses, and 
they in fact have a positive influence when compared 
Fig. 3. Radiation dose consequence relation based 
on the LNT and hormesis model, based on [7]
to the total elimination of radiation. This is not yet un-
derstood but it is linked to the evolution and cellular 
mechanisms of making cells more protected with small 
continued stimulus. Similar mechanisms are demon-
strated with different chemicals, but they have also not 
been included in the regulation yet, [8].
For the Chernobyl accident, there is no evidence of 
radiation-induced cancer in humans at doses less than 
100 mSv from acute doses or at doses less than 500 mSv 
for protracted doses. The rate of DNA damage caused 
by background and low doses of ionizing radiation is 
exceedingly small compared to DNA damage caused by 
breathing oxygen (~500 g O2 per day for standard man).
One interesting example is when about 10,000 peo-
ple occupied 1,700 apartments in Taiwan for up to 20 
years, receiving a cumulative average radiation dose 
of 400 mSv from construction steel contaminated with 
60Co. A sharply reduced incidence of cancer and birth 
defects was seen in apartment inhabitants, [7]. It is 
claimed in [7] that the most effective method for re-
ducing lung cancer risk from smoking, other than quit-
ting, may be to have an annual full-body CT scan.
The first conclusion is that the factual and theoretical 
evidence points to replacing the classical causal regula-
tory defaults used to deal with low dose – response, the 
LNT, and the linear at low - dose – response models, or 
monotonic functions, with the J-and inverse J-shaped 
models or relations. These models have been demon-
strated to apply to toxicological and cancer outcomes 
for a very wide range of substances and diseases. The 
classical defaults may still be applicable to a case by 
case basis. The reasons for changing the defaults in-
clude the fact that the J-shaped class of models quanti-
fies a wide set of health benefits that are completely 
excluded from estimations that use monotonic models. 
Abandoning LNT will reflect directly in a number of 
dimensions. Regulation would be then relaxed, and 
this will significantly reduce the required resources for 
nuclear industry and medicine. Decommissioning re-
quirements would be more realistic and this will make 
all related activities less resources intensive. This will 
apply to regular decommissioning of facilities after 
operation, but, even more significantly wide areas ac-
cidentally contaminated. Finally, the estimated delayed 
consequences would be more realistic and will allow 
for better perception of the total risk.
It is because of LNT that so many people are not able 
to get back to their homes and that about $500 billion 
are spent for decommissioning wide areas. The gov-
ernment in the USA is scheduled to spend about $350 
billion for cleaning up radioactive contamination and 
waste and decommissioning about 100 old nuclear 
power plants in 31 states in the next few decades. The 
same reason is that the number of predicted delayed 
casualties is estimated to several thousands (some ex-
treme anti-nuclear organizations produce 100 times 
higher casualty estimates based on the models which 
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are even more conservative than LNT). However, the 
fact is that this risk is so small that it could not be mea-
sured and it is completely covered with statistical noise 
and much more significant regular life risks. 
The evidence of how fear from risk might cause the 
highest risk could be found in the fact that after the 
Chernobyl accident there were an estimated 1,250 sui-
cides and thousands excess elective abortions, while 
200,000 individuals experienced an unnecessary trau-
matic evacuation.
There is a perception of nuclear energy being dan-
gerous even during normal operation regardless of nu-
merous studies proving the opposite. The peaceful use 
of nuclear power technology produces materials that 
are radioactive. These materials can come into contact 
with people principally through small releases during 
plant operation, accidents in NPPs, accidents in trans-
porting radioactive materials, and escape of radioac-
tive wastes from confinement systems. All of them 
taken together, with accidents treated probabilistically, 
will eventually expose the average American to about 
0.2% of his/her exposure from natural radiation. Since 
natural radiation is estimated to cause about 1% of all 
cancers, radiation due to nuclear technology should 
eventually increase our cancer risk by 0.002% (one part 
in 50,000), reducing our life expectancy by less than 
one hour. By comparison, our loss of life expectancy 
from competitive electricity generation technologies, 
burning coal, oil, or gas, is estimated to range from 3 to 
40 days [6]. This is all even using the conservative LNT 
method .
In reality, consequences from the LNT model are 
enormously significant because they put an unneces-
sary burden on society resources and influence risk 
perception very significantly.
3. RISK ACCEPTANCE
Risk perception refers to an individual’s intuitive 
judgment about some choices. This is something ev-
erybody uses without an opportunity to have insights 
in risk assessment results. That is something where one 
believes that has the complete picture where not only 
probability of occurrence and the severity of the as-
sociated consequences are included but also benefits 
from a certain activity. Regardless of the base for risk 
perception that is crucial for certain activity risk accep-
tance. Risk acceptance involves subjective balancing of 
benefits with risks. 
Good public policy involves a balanced approach to 
overall society risks. Public perception of the risk posed 
by environmental hazards also depends on person’s 
background, income, gender, education, etc. Perceived 
risks may also stem from the perception that govern-
ment officials cannot be trusted to competently man-
age the risks of hazardous facilities, and that private 
interest will stand before what is in the best interest of 
the society as a whole.
Overall benefits might include not only direct advan-
tages related to the development but also lots of spe-
cific advantages like employment, increased local tax 
revenues, and infrastructure enhancements. More gen-
erally, support is also related to the perceived need for 
the facility. Local residents may also be more inclined 
to favor a facility when employees of the facility are in 
their social network. Familiarity with the activities and 
technology related to the facility also appears to de-
crease risk perceptions [10].
A public perception of risk and policy preferences 
depends on history and it is also dynamic and may re-
spond to events and policy developments at specific 
points in time. The overall support in the USA for nu-
clear energy declined following the Three Mile Island 
nuclear power plant accident in 1979, and dropped 
again after the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster in 
1986. However, it did not happen in Great Britain, and 
some other countries have much stronger reactions 
(i.e., a recent example is a decision about a quick nucle-
ar energy phase out in Germany after the Fukushima 
accident). 
In general, risk acceptance is very different and im-
portant. Risk assessment is a much easier problem than 
to estimate risk acceptability. This might be in part be-
cause there are no transparent and universally ac-
cepted safety goals so for every activity new rules and 
new approaches are applied. This necessarily results in 
increased inefficiencies of risk reduction and subopti-
mal resources use. The best approach would be to set 
up safety goals that are neutral in respect of the choice 
of technology or activity. Practically, the lack of safety 
goals or their differences, costs society enormously, 
and actually increases the risk.
3. 1.  SAFETY GOALS
Basically, any facility/activity should be built/oper-
ated in such a way as to satisfy a given set of safety 
goals. This is a goal-oriented approach where goals are 
first specified, and then the facility, activity or item is 
designed, created, operated and maintained accord-
ingly. However, two problems must be answered for 
the goal-oriented approach:
1. How safe is safe enough? This requires a set of 
safety goals to be satisfied.
2. How to deal with uncertainties? The current risk 
quantification involves significant uncertainties.
Some countries apply numerical safety goals regard-
ing NPP operation and modifications. According to 
Berg [11], this approach is well illustrated in the nuclear 
industry uses of PSA for compliance with formal cri-
teria but without similar success related to the public 
risk perception. However, the role and interpretation 
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of such quantitative guidelines vary from country to 
country. A dominant opinion is that safety goals should 
not be used within a regulatory framework of strict ac-
ceptance or non-acceptance criteria but should be 
considered as one factor in arriving at regulatory judg-
ment.
In July 2011, the Western European Nuclear Regula-
tors Association (WENRA) proposed safety goals for 
new NPPs built in Europe. Safety goals for a new reac-
tor factor were learned from lessons referring to the 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents in 1979 and 
1986. Compared with reactors currently in operation, 
the goal concerns in particular are as follows:
•	 Reduction of the risk of an accident with core 
meltdown,
•	 Reduction of radioactive releases to the environ-
ment in the event of a core meltdown, and
•	 Resistance to airplane crashes.
In addition, the reinforcement of the defense in 
depth concept for new reactors is proposed:
•	 The practicability of safety improvements at de-
sign stage is greater than that for an operating 
plant, more stringent application of the refer-
ence levels is expected for new reactors.
•	 There is room for safety improvements that go 
beyond the intent of the reference levels for ex-
isting reactors and which reflect the use of state-
of-the art methodologies and techniques and 
the results of safety research.
There is no practical definition of safety goals. Per-
ception and attitudes towards the safety goals vary 
significantly among different industry sectors and 
countries. The risk acceptance is very specific for every 
hazard. Even the state agencies/regulatory bodies are 
not consistent on the subject of risk acceptance. So in 
this way the comparison of risks from different tech-
nologies is a very complex task accompanied by many 
controversies. The safety goal is sufficiently defined by 
the level of acceptable risk.
Perhaps the most widely sought quantity in the man-
agement of hazardous technologies is the acceptable 
level of risk. Technologies whose risks fall below that 
level could go about their business, without worrying 
further about the risks they impose on others. Riskier 
technologies would face closure if they could not be 
brought into compliance.
For designers and operators, having a well-defined 
acceptable level of risk would provide a clear target for 
managing their technology. For regulators, identifying 
an acceptable level of risk would mean resolving value 
issues at the time standards are set, allowing an agen-
cy’s technical staff to monitor compliance mechanical-
ly, without having to make case-specific political and 
ethical decisions. For the public, a clearly enunciated 
acceptable level of risk would provide a concise focus 
for evaluating how well its welfare is protected, saving 
it from having to understand the details of the techni-
cal processes creating those risks, [12].
The acceptability of risk could be an absolute or a rel-
ative concept and it involves different factors. Consid-
erations in these judgments may include the certainty 
and severity of the risk, the reversibility of the health 
effect, the knowledge or familiarity of the risk, wheth-
er the risk is voluntarily accepted or involuntarily im-
posed, whether individuals are compensated for their 
exposure to the risk, the advantages of the activity, and 
the risks and advantages for any alternatives.
Specific approaches to setting risk acceptance criteria 
are based on a combination of fundamental principles 
and deductive methods. Most cultivated is the ALARP 
approach (As Low As Reasonable Practicable), capital-
izing the advantages of formal analysis and all principal 
criteria. Requiring risk to be as low as reasonably practi-
cable, ALARP provides conditional rather than absolute 
criteria; uniquely capturing that risk acceptance is a 
trade-off problem. Problems are yet addressed, notably 
in resource intensiveness and the imprecise notion of 
gross disproportionality. Conceptually close, but prac-
tically far from ALARP, is ALARA (Achievable instead 
Practicable). Whereas the upper criteria represent the 
start of ALARP discussions, they serve as the endpoint 
in ALARA. Arguments of reasonableness considered 
are already built into the strict upper limits of ALARA, 
[13]. The ALARP approach resolves how to deal with 
risks between acceptable and unacceptable levels, and 
in that way cover uncertain estimates.
Strict criteria are also provided by the GAMAB ap-
proach requiring new systems to be globally as good 
as any existing system already in use. GAMAB (globale-
ment au moins équivalent) can be seen as learning-ori-
ented bootstrapping, but may reject developments on 
an erroneous standard of reference [13]. 
The third example of a specific approach with risk 
objectives is MEM (Minimum Endogenous Mortality). 
With this approach any acceptable risk has to have 
only strictly defined relative contribution to the over-
all life risk (defined based on the least threatened part 
of population aged between 5 and 20). Figure 4 shows 
one example where it is visible that acceptable risk is 
reduced for dangers which could result in an increased 
number of fatalities per accident. This is related to the 
worse perception of such type of accidents regardless 
of a risk-neutral view that only values cumulative risk. 
Safety goals for short-term fatalities for NPP are e.g. at 
the 10-6 level (in Japan and the USA), all industry aver-
age risk is at about half of the MEM reference 10-4, [9]. 
How conservative this is might be more clear if one has 
in mind that the average home accidents fatality rate is 
at the MEM level, and that all causes are at the level of 
one order of magnitude higher for 40 year-old persons, 
and two orders of magnitude for 60 year-old persons, 
with most dominant contribution from cancer (data for 
England and Wales from [9]). 
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It is clear that the problem is not a lack of available 
methods for risk goal determination or acceptable lev-
els of risk but the whole environment in which deci-
sions about risk are made by different stakeholders in 
any question. Perhaps this environment includes per-
ception of risk, history, culture, and the current state 
of the decision making process and risk management. 
However, by accepting the risk goal method all stake 
holders involved could improve communication and 
set the crucial central point around which an optimal 
solution for society might emerge.
Fig. 4. Tolerable individual risk and relationship with 
a high number of fatalities - MEM approach, [14]
3.2. RISK OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 
 COMPARISON
An alternative approach to risk management from hav-
ing risk goals might be to compare risk in a certain do-
main and always choose the best available option. This is 
in general an interesting idea, but it is a burden in real-
ity with almost all issues mentioned before. There are so 
many different prospectives and uncertainties that sum-
ming them with agreement of all stakeholders seems too 
hard to reach the objective. Here we would like to make 
certain facts which might help to compare risks and ben-
efits from different available energy sources.
The historical operating record of different energy 
options, technologies for electricity generation, and 
the models to anticipate risks for their utilization, en-
able analysts to compare these technologies. It is pos-
sible to compare different risks, e.g. immediate risks, 
delayed risks, environmental risks, economic risks etc. 
Though the experience and the analyses provide a very 
clear picture, their use in decision making is practically 
small. Thus, it is evident that risk assessment even from 
the significant experience is not used in the risk deci-
sion making process.
From numerous indicators here we have selected 
three to present how clearly the choice could be made 
based on the experience and hard data. Firstly, com-
parison of energy sources is presented based on the 
number of fatalities from accidents. Then comparison 
is made based on the delayed negative effects, and 
finally comparison is made based on the emissions of 
greenhouse gases per energy produced.
From the experience it is possible to compare differ-
ent energy sources on the basis of how many people 
have died or how much people’s life has shortened for 
the certain amount of energy produced. Short-term ef-
fects data are much more clear because delayed effects 
are not easy to measure or estimate. Figure 5 presents 
the number of fatalities per GWeyr for conventional 
energy sources (renewable are believed to be on the 
lower side). This advantage is even more visible when 
risk is presented as a distribution over a certain number 
of fatalities per accident by the so-called F-N curve. This 
is easy to understand because all major accidents with 
*Different values for non-OECD are related to the  most significant contribution from the Banqiao and Shimantan dam failures
Figure 5: Number of fatalities per generated GWeyr from accidents 
for different conventional energy sources, [15]
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a big number of fatalities are connected with hydro, oil, 
and coal (see Table 1 for the list of major accidents). 
Disproportion between data and perception is even 
bigger when comparison is made for the effects of nor-
mal operation of facilities for energy production. Here 
we present the situation for Germany where a rush 
decision was made to phase out nuclear power plants 
quickly and compensate that for conventional (natural 
gas and coal) and renewable energy sources (wind and 
photovoltaic). In Figure 6, it is visible that this decision 
will not only cost much more but it will in fact have ex-
actly the opposite significant negative effect on people’s 
life. It is clear that nuclear actually stands best, even bet-
ter than all renewables (especially photovoltaic).
The evaluation of historical experience demonstrates 
numerical differences between the aggregated risk 
indicators obtained for the various energy chains, as 
well as between the corresponding frequency-conse-
quence curves. Regional differences have been shown 
to be of utmost importance for the nuclear and hydro 
chains. The expectation values for fatality rates due to 
severe accidents are lowest for hydro and nuclear pow-
er in OECD countries. This is also reflected in low ex-
ternal costs associated with severe accidents estimated 
using state-of-the-art methods. At the same time, the 
extent of consequences of hypothetical extreme acci-
dents is largest in the case of hydro and nuclear.
Fig. 6. Years of life lost per generated GWh for 
different energy sources in Germany during normal 
operation in 2000, [16]
Global warming and human contribution to the 
problem is in the center of all energy planning activi-
ties. Therefore, it is very important how much green-
house gases (GHG) certain energy source emits. Figure 
7 shows CO2 equivalent GHG emissions per energy unit 
produced. It is again clear that nuclear is and should be 
part of the climate change related measures. Nuclear 
energy is as good as or better than renewable only on 
the emissions base. For example, almost 70% of elec-
tricity generated without emitting greenhouse gases 
in the USA during 2009 was from nuclear power plants. 
Thanks to nuclear power, 650 million of metric tons of 
CO2 were not emitted during 2009 in the USA. This is 
almost equivalent to CO2 emissions from all cars in the 
USA (137 million cars emit 710 million Mt of CO2).
Fig. 7. Greenhouse gas emissions per kWh 
of electricity generated for different energy 
technologies, [16, based on Dones et al., 2004]
Finally, this all could be presented in some way as the 
cost of electricity produced. It is clear that the current 
production cost of electricity is significantly in favor 
of the conventional energy sources including nuclear, 
and that renewable are much more expensive even 
without including the cost of higher penetration (due 
to the power, their intermittence and additional power 
system costs). For a balanced decision about optimal 
energy sources use, it is important to try to express all 
cost they put to the society. This is done in lots of dif-
ferent ways and it is usually treated as external cost. 
Figure 8 presents one such comparison of different 
energy sources cost based on all influences on people 
and environment not included in the market cost (in-
cluding the whole life cycle). This additional cost is only 
insignificant for nuclear and renewable energy sources. 
Other sources have external cost which is at the level of 
their regular cost of production which makes a practi-
cal solution for internalizing them very hard to solve. 
Deregulation of the energy sector makes the position 
of a nuclear option less competitive. The subsidies for 
renewable energy sources insubstantially alleviate 
their position, although the price is hardly predictable 
with stronger penetration of renewables.
It is evident that a sufficient base exists not only 
with models but also with hard date and experience to 
make a comparison between different energy sources. 
However, in reality, this is often neglected, and there 
seems to be a long way before judgment and decisions 
about energy sources selection will be based on the ra-
tionale grounds when that is possible and beneficial for 
the society as a whole. Some old and recent experience 
illustrates how strong perception is regardless of evi-
dence and experience. This year, during the Fukushima 
accident progression, 51 miners died in coal mines in 
Pakistan and that was barely covered by news. In 1975, 
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the Banqiao dam in China, which was designed for 1 in 
1,000 year flood, failed because of Typhoon Nina colli-
sion with the cold front-line causing thereby flood of 
order 1 in 2,000 years. Consequently, the total of 62 
dams failed. According to the Hydrology Department 
of Henan Province, in the province, approximately 
26,000 people died from flooding and another 145,000 
died during subsequent isolation and epidemics. In ad-
dition, about 5,960,000 buildings collapsed, and 11 mil-
lion residents were affected. This disaster was declassi-
fied in 2005.







Benxihu Colliery, China 1942 1,549 Coal dust explosion
Banqiao Dam, China 1975 26,000 Typhoon Nina
Machhu II, India 1979 2,500 Dam failure
Hirakud, India 1980 1,000 Dam failure
Cubatao, Brazil 1984 508 Oil fire
Mexico 1984 498 Liquefied petroleum gas
Chernobyl, Ukraine 1986 56 Nuclear power plant
Asha-ufa, Siberia 1989 600 Liquefied petroleum gas
Dobrinja, Yugoslavia 1990 178 Coal mine
Durunkha, Egypt 1994 580 Fire in oil tank
Warri, Nigeria 1998 >500 Fire in oil  pipeline
Table 1. Major accidents in energy related facilities 
with a large number of immediate deaths
4. CONCLUSION
The conclusion can be drawn that electricity genera-
tion is one of the activities in our society whose health 
and environmental risks are relatively well known, even 
with respect to the probability of unlikely but possibly 
serious events.
Small risks of utilization of nuclear power can only 
be assessed with significant uncertainties both for sce-
narios and for impact of doses on consequences. En-
hanced protection from small doses costs enormously 
and increases risk (not only for nuclear power utiliza-
tion). Education, communication and the total risk ap-
proach can serve as a basis for risk management in the 
way to maximize the benefits for the society, without 
conniving to the prejudices and without generating 
increased costs and real risk. There is no life without 
risk and the most important is how big the relative risk 
is, and how much it would cost to decrease it. This is a 
real situation where the risk itself has become and was 
demonstrated as the biggest risk of all.
One way of determining a quantitative risk level is to 
consider PSA. PSA perspective on severe accident risks 
is particularly important for energy chains whose risks 
are dominated by power plants since the historical ex-
perience of accidents is scarce or/and its applicability is 
highly restricted to a particular type of plant. Thus, PSA 
studies are expected to provide most representative re-
sults for hydro and nuclear power plants.
Based on the results of risk analysis, risk manage-
ment supports the process of decision making both 
for the industries and the respective regulatory bodies. 
Whenever decision alternatives have been identified 
and ranked by comparing the expected value of ben-
efits or losses on the basis of risk assessments, the risks 
must be considered in regard to their acceptability. It 
is suggested to differentiate between tangible and in-
tangible risk, i.e. risks which may be easily expressed 
in monetary risks and others. Which intangible values 
should be considered in a given case has to be checked 
by risk identification.
But without having safety goals this is not good 
enough. Ideally, such quantitative safety goals are not 
limited to one type of plants but to any large industrial 
plant or any industrial activity that requires safety-
related systems to ensure safety (e.g., petrochemical 
facilities, aviation, railway, etc.). Therefore, the need for 
the development of risk criteria, which would support 
risk informed decision-making, is expressed world-
wide. However, risk acceptance is also correlated to 
non- technical factors (i.e., cultural context, etc.).
Compared with other sources of energy, nuclear 
power is one of the safest. Millions of people in the de-
veloping world still live in poverty, and it can alleviate 
their access to energy. Global energy demand will con-
tinue to rise, so energy will continue to get more ex-
pensive as fossil fuels become more and more difficult 
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to extract. The use of renewables is increasing and will 
play an important part in the future energy mix, but it 
is questionable whether renewables alone will be able 
to satisfy rising energy demands, and what is going to 
be the final economical benefit.
The impacts of the Fukushima accident itself have 
not been justified as significant enough to exclude con-
tinued use of nuclear energy.  It is evident that the ulti-
mate solution for nuclear safety is further improvement 
of design. Dependence on the external power supply is 
an intolerable risk. Generation III+ of reactors already in 
use incorporate isolated and protected power supply, 
as well as passive cooling systems. Open containment 
of spent fuel rod ponds is also an unnecessary risk.
Nevertheless, the case of nuclear power remains 
strongly based on all evidence considering social, eco-
nomical and environmental factors. All forms of energy 
generation carry risks. However, a lack of safety goals, 
differences in risk perception, methods, values, and 
distrust threaten to prevent the society from achieving 
optimal solutions regarding risks and benefits.
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